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I. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright lawsuits are ubiquitous in the age of Napster2 and its progeny.3  It 
almost seems as though everyone is either a victim or an aggressor in this war 
between the protection of ideas and the propagation of ideas.  Plaintiffs are well-
known to love deep pockets, but whose pockets can they reach?  Copyright law 
provides two causes of action for imposing secondary liability on parties indirectly 
involved in infringing activities.4  Those who materially aid, induce, or cause 
copyright infringement by another may be held liable for contributory infringement 
                                                          
1 2009 Juris Doctor candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law. Received the Janet E. Kerr 
Achievement Award for authoring this case note. 
2 Napster, the popular Internet music file-sharing service, brought mainstream attention to online 
file-sharing before it was eventually brought to court. See Napster, infra notes 120-125 and 
accompanying text. 
3 Those who keep up with the news are probably most aware of the RIAA (Recording Industry 
Association of America), an organization of music artists and publishers which gained recent notoriety 
as a highly litigious anti-piracy group. 
4 See infra Part II, D and E, notes 60-136 and accompanying text. 
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of copyright.5  Those who profit from the infringement of another while possessing 
the power to stop or limit the infringer’s activities may be held liable for vicarious 
infringement of copyright.6  Both forms of secondary liability have persisted 
through history, subtly adapting to a moving target: infringement aided by 
increasingly newer technology.7  Recent cases have already applied secondary 
copyright liability to piracy over the Internet;8  and now, the Ninth Circuit has 
addressed the issue of online piracy funding.9 
In Perfect 10 v. Visa, adult entertainment publisher Perfect 10 ran an Internet 
website distributing copyrighted photos to paid subscribers.10  Other websites 
copied these photos without permission and offered the material for sale online.11  
Payment processing for these sales was handled by Visa and other defendants.12  
Perfect 10 notified the defendants of this infringing activity and requested that the 
offending sites be denied payment processing services.13  The defendants did not 
comply and Perfect 10 brought action for secondary copyright liability, among 
other claims.14  The trial court’s dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, which held that Perfect 10 could not establish claims for contributory 
or vicarious infringement of copyright.15  In short, Visa escaped liability because it 
was not directly involved in the distribution or advertisement of the infringing 
materials; rather, it was only involved in financial transactions connected to the 
infringement.16 
In this environment where every copyright holder seems to be looking for 
someone to sue, Perfect 10 represents a major windfall for credit card companies.  
While financial processors operating on the Internet have fewer obligations than 
other online service providers, copyright holders are now denied a major avenue in 
enforcing their intellectual property interests. 
This case note discusses the origins, reasoning, and impact of the Perfect 10 
decision.  It argues that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Perfect 10 was based on 
flawed reasoning and misapplication of precedent, thereby creating an erroneous 
decision inconsistent with the law.  Part II summarizes United States copyright 
law, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, contributory copyright infringement, 
and vicarious copyright infringement.17  Part III describes the relevant facts of 
Perfect 10 as well as its technological and economic contexts.18  Part IV examines 
the arguments and interplay between the majority and dissenting opinions of 
                                                          
5 See Gershwin, infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
6 See Shapiro, infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text. 
7 See Gershwin, infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
8 See Napster, infra notes 120-25; Grokster, infra notes 88-96; Amazon, infra notes 126-36. 
9 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
10 Id. at 793. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 792. 
16 See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra Part II, notes 22-136 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra Part III, notes 137-172 and accompanying text. 
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Perfect 10.19  Part V presents the future implications of the Perfect 10 decision.20  
The case note is concluded in Part VI.21 
II. COPYRIGHTS AND SECONDARY LIABILITY 
A. Copyright Law in the United States 
A “creative work” is “the product of creative expression” ranging from 
blockbuster films to this very article.22  It is a fruit of labor; a creation similar to a 
handcrafted chair or a loaf of bread.  And like these tangible goods, creative works 
carry value: real economic worth in their usefulness and other qualities.  Yet, 
unlike other goods, the very nature of a creative work often allows its worth to 
easily be diluted.  For instance, little effort is needed to reproduce another author’s 
text and distribute or sell it in place of the author.  The original author, who 
expended the creative energy essential to bringing the work into being, receives 
less compensation and other benefit than would have been received had all 
distribution and sale been under the author’s control.23  This creates a chilling 
effect on the creative process: a fear of wasted effort that discourages authorship of 
new works and potentially hinders intellectual progress.  Hoping to avoid such 
pitfalls in their developing nation, the United States’ founding fathers took 
copyrights into serious concern.24 
Thus, the United States Constitution was drafted to include protection for 
this creative interest.25  The Copyright Clause of the constitution grants Congress 
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”26  Acting on this authority, federal legislation has 
defined copyright protection and, over history, extended it.27  The scope of 
copyright protection generally grants the copyright holder exclusive rights for a 
limited period28 to reproduce the work, create derivative works based on the work, 
                                                          
19 See infra Part IV, notes 173-271 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra Part V, notes 272-296 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra Part VI and p. 49. 
22 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1637 (8th ed. 2004). 
23 It is not always solely a matter of losing money: fame and recognition for an author are also 
affected by unauthorized copying. 
24 Thomas A. Mitchell, Note, Copyright, Congress, and Constitutionality: How the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act Goes Too Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115, 2120-21 (2004). 
25 Id. at 2119. 
26 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.  In addition to being the basis for copyrights, this clause is also the 
basis for congressional regulation of patents.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 (2003).  Copyrights 
and patents are not to be confused with trademarks, whose protection is targeted towards consumer 
identification of commercial items.  15 U.S.C. § 1127; see infra note 232. 
27 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 361 (8th ed. 2004).  Federal copyright statutes reside within Title 
17 of the United States Code.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (defining rights 
possessed by copyright holders); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (defining infringement of 
copyright); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (defining fair-use non-infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 1201-05 (2000) 
(addressing circumvention of anti-copying measures and other new technology issues in copyright). 
28 As copyright essentially creates a monopoly, the intent was to limit its duration.  Hideaki Shirata, 
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transfer the work, display the work, and sell or lease the work.29  Protection is 
given for “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,”30 including pictures, video, music, audio recordings, literary text, and 
architecture.31  This protection affixes to qualified works at the moment of their 
creation; for published works, protection attaches at the time of publication.32  
These rules apply nationwide—as of 1978, all state common law and statutes 
regarding copyright are preempted by federal laws.33 
B. Direct Infringement of Copyright 
Under Title 17, a violation of any exclusive right granted by a copyrighted 
work constitutes an infringement of copyright by the violator.34  In the event of an 
infringement, the copyright holder may sue the infringer subject to the normal 
rules of civil procedure.35  The remedies available to the copyright holder include 
injunctions36 and monetary damages, including the infringer’s profits.37 
However, after Justice Story’s storied opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, we have 
an exception to the rule: “fair use”38 violations that don’t constitute infringement.39  
The doctrine has since been codified into Title 17, allowing the reproduction and 
derivative use of copyrighted materials for purposes like education, news, and 
parody.40  Courts use four factors to determine whether a use of copyrighted 
material qualifies as fair use: “(1) the purpose and character of the use . . . ; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the [relative] amount and substantiality of the 
portion used . . . ; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.”41  Works are thus qualified when they have 
                                                          
The Origin of Two American Copyright Theories: A Case of the Reception of English Law, 30 J. ARTS 
MGMT. L. & SOC'Y 193, 201 (2000).  Generally, works created during or after 1978 are protected from 
the time of creation until seventy years past the author’s death.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). 
29 17 U.S.C. § 106.  There is also an exclusive right to perform the work if the work is of a 
performable type (e.g., dramatic scripts, choreographies, and music).  17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6).  In 
addition to having exclusive rights to sell copies of a work, a copyright holder is allowed to transfer the 
copyright of the work itself, or a subset of those rights.  17 U.S.C. § 204 (2000). 
30 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
31 Id.; for an enumerated list, see 17 U.S.C. §§  102(a)(1)-(8), 1301(a)(1)-(2) (2000).  It is important 
to note that ideas themselves are not copyrighted—only their expression in a medium is.  17 U.S.C. § 
102(b) (2000). 
32 17 U.S.C. § 104(a)-(b) (2000).  Under the current statute, copyright protection requires no formal 
registration of a work, nor does it require marking the work with the omniprevalent “©” or other 
copyright notice.  However, works created prior to 1978 must be registered in accordance with older 
law.  See 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2000 & Supp. V. 2005). 
33 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (“Rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed exclusively 
by this title.  Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right . . . under the common law or statutes of 
any State”). 
34 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. V 2005). 
35 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000). 
36 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000). 
37 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
38 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 634 (8th ed. 2004). 
39 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
40 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
41 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4). 
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diminished negative impact on the interests and incentives of the original copyright 
holder, thereby avoiding harms addressed by copyright.  The value and usability of 
fair uses, to society, are often independent of the authors’ interests in their original 
works.42  Furthermore, derivative works may carry forth creative value of their 
own, making new interests to fall within copyright’s domain of protection.43 
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The most recent significant change to United States copyright law came with 
the controversial44 and technology-conscious Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) in 1998.45  The new provisions target copyright pirates,46 creating 
causes of action47 for the circumvention of copyright protection technology48 and 
interference with or falsification of copyright information.49  Both types of conduct 
are also subject to criminal law: willful and profit-seeking violations mandate 
substantial fines or prison terms.50 
While strong new restrictions were given by the DMCA, the DMCA also 
                                                          
42 For example: even though a school library contains many copyrighted books, allowing students 
to photocopy text from these books for educational research is not infringement.  See MODEL POLICY 
CONCERNING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PHOTOCOPYING FOR CLASSROOM, RESEARCH AND LIBRARY 
RESERVE (American Library Association 1982), available at http://www.cni.org/docs/infopols/ 
ALA.html.  Rather, it’s a fair use because: the author probably won’t lose any sales as a result; the 
author’s effort will still be recognized within the student’s bibliography or citations; the reproduction is 
of limited scope; and, finally, it furthers good faith educational interests. 
43 For instance, parodies represent an important commodity in the marketplace of ideas.  In this 
marketplace, free expression is necessary for a lively environment in which the better ideas rise to the 
top.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).  Television programs like South Park depend 
on the ability to create derivative work in parody in order to effectively convey social commentary.  See 
South Park (Comedy Central television broadcast).  This results in entirely new works which possess 
unique entertainment and philosophical value independent of the derivative source.  The South Park 
parody of the film “300”, for example, does not replace or diminish interest in the original film.  See 
South Park: D-Yikes! (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 11, 2007); 300 (Warner Bros. 
Entertainment, Inc. 2007).  Though the two works may share key plot elements, the South Park episode 
injects comedy which can’t be found in the movie.  The movie, on the other heand, draws audiences 
with drama, action, and special effects that aren’t found in its South Park parody.  Both can profit in 
parallel because each fills a distinct niche, despite some overlap in content.  As courts have noted, the 
primary objective of copyright law has been to promote “creativity for the general public good.”  Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (emphasis added) (citing Fox 
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).  In this case, the public benefit of having two distinct 
sources of entertainment outweigh Warner Bros.’ interest in monopolizing 300’s plot premise. 
44 Amy P. Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 179 A.L.R. FED. 319 (2002).  The controversies stemming from the DMCA’s passage 
are varied.  For instance, some argue that the new provisions of the DMCA exceed congressional 
power.  See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 24.  Others contend that the DMCA is unacceptably open to 
abuse by those who want to shut down websites for non-copyright reasons.  See, e.g., Mike Masnick, 
DMCA Misuse: Trying to Take Down a Negative Movie Review, TECHDIRT, Jan. 14, 2008, 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080113/235553.shtml. 
45 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05, 512, 4001, 1301-32 (1999). 
46 See infra note 75. 
47 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000). 
48 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000). 
49 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000). 
50 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2000). 
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included a “Safe Harbor”51 of powerful provisions designed to protect entities such 
as Internet website hosts.52  Under the DMCA Safe Harbor, digital network53 
service providers54 are not monetarily liable for third party copyright infringement 
occurring on their hardware or across their transmission lines.55  However, such 
service providers are subject to subpoena by a copyright holder for the 
identification of any infringing customer56 and must comply with a copyright 
holder’s request to remove infringing material from the service network.57  Failure 
by the service provider to comply with this “take-down notice” allows the 
copyright holder to seek injunctive relief in the form of court orders prohibiting 
display of the infringing material.58 
The significance of the DMCA Safe Harbor is apparent with an examination 
of Internet infrastructure.  The promulgation of data and ideas relies on the use of 
service providers for Internet distribution.  Their presence is essential.  
                                                          
51 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
52 See infra note 54.  Web hosts are companies which own, apportion, and rent use of servers.  
Marshall Brain, How Stuff Works, How Web Servers Work: Clients and Servers, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/web-server4.htm.  A server is a computer with a persistent Internet 
connection on which Internet files and documents are stored and distributed to other Internet users on 
request—it acts as a physical and virtual repository for Internet data.  Id.; see infra note 158 for more 
information about the Internet. 
53 This seems to generally refer to the Internet, though policy implications make it likely that other 
digital networks would qualify, such as those used in cell phone communication.  See infra notes 54-55 
and accompanying text. 
54 For purposes of the DMCA, a “service provider” is “a provider of online services or network 
access, or the operator of facilities therefor . . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).  As it is apparent in the text 
of the statute, the courts routinely apply DMCA service provider status over “a broad variety of Internet 
activities” without needing to split hairs.  Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 
1100 (W.D. Wash. 2004).  If the issue at action deals only with § 512(a) “transitory digital network 
communications,” then the definition is limited only to service providers which deal in the routing of 
the communications.  Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 n.5; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).  Some 
examples of DMCA-qualifying service providers: Internet access providers, website hosts, user-
submitted-content websites, and online auctions.  See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (Internet access provider AOL treated as a DMCA service provider); Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 
No. CV064436 FMC AJWX, slip op. (C.D.Cal. 2007) (user-submitted video site YouTube treated as a 
DMCA service provider); Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
(online auction lister “eBay clearly meets the DMCA’s broad definition of online ‘service provider’”). 
55 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).  The “third party” nature of the infringement must be emphasized: the Safe 
Harbor does not apply to service providers who actively post infringing materials themselves or 
otherwise take an editorial role regarding the infringing content.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  This mirrors 
the publisher/distributor distinction in defamation law whereby an innocent distributor of a publication 
(such as a newspaper delivery boy) is not liable for defamatory content contained in the publication’s 
text.  53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 177 (2008).  A distributor is only liable if he 
possesses some editorial control over the publication, like the liable publisher does.  Id.  That is, one is 
liable for defamation only if they have had the opportunity to review and change the defamatory 
content.  Accordingly, service providers who unknowingly link to or provide locations of infringing 
material are also exempt from related monetary liability.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (d). 
56 17 U.S.C. § 512(h). 
57 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).  This is also known as the “take-down notice” requirement.  While it seems 
as though this provision could open the door to a flood of fraudulent notices demanding action by a 
service provider, the DMCA includes harsh penalties, including attorney fees, for misrepresentations.  
17 U.S.C. § 512(f).  Furthermore, if the true copyright holder has had material improperly removed 
under the DMCA, they can submit a counter-notice to restore the materials.  17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3). 
58 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).  The restraining orders generally force the service provider to block access to 
the particular material or to block the infringing customer from the service altogether.  17 U.S.C. § 
512(j)(1)(i)-(ii). 
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Furthermore, any given web host may have thousands of separate parties utilizing 
its services for the storage of hundreds of computer files—monitoring each of them 
for copyright infringement is highly impractical.  While copyright interests still 
obligate a service provider to remove infringing material, the investigative duty is 
shifted to the copyright holders through the notice provision.  In the meantime, 
service providers are able to devote their resources towards improving other areas 
of business without fear of bankruptcy brought on by a third party’s actions.59  
Thus, Internet development is furthered while copyright holders still maintain an 
avenue through which they can protect their interests. 
D. Contributory Infringement of Copyright 
As evidenced by the need for protections such as the DMCA Safe Harbor, 
avenues exist for extending liability beyond direct infringers.  In greater tort law, 
“one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortuous act is jointly and 
severally liable with the prime tortfeasor.”60  Such is also the case with copyright 
infringement,61 as the Copyright Act does not differentiate among levels of 
participation.62  A common law doctrine serving to fill that gap, called contributory 
copyright infringement, has been described as descending from enterprise liability 
in tort law.63  Under this doctrine, “one who, with knowledge of the infringing 
activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another, may be held liable.”64 
Even acts such as advertising an infringing product can constitute 
contributory infringement, so long as there is knowledge.65  One helpful and 
historic example of involvement-liability interactions in contributory infringement 
is the Screen Gems case, from deep in the reign of the phonograph record.66  In 
Screen Gems, a record album of hit songs was produced, infringing the copyright 
of several songs owned by the plaintiff.67  The plaintiff brought action against 
several defendants involved in different areas of the album’s production and 
                                                          
59 Because of this policy concern, the DMCA Safe Harbor is likely to protect beyond just the 
Internet.  Other technological services may also be used by customers for infringement.  See, e.g., supra 
note 54. 
60 Niel Boorstyn, 1 BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 10.06[2], 10-21 (1994). 
61 Id. 
62 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161 (2d. Cir. 1971). 
63 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996). 
64 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.  The same rule is applied in the Ninth Circuit.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d 
at 795.  While the liability here is described as “secondary” or even “vicarious,” it is important to note 
that contributory infringement differs from vicarious infringement, which also gives rise to secondary 
or vicarious liability and often appears alongside contributory infringement in lawsuits.  See infra note 
116.  Under vicarious infringement, a defendant is liable if he profits from infringement while 
possessing a right or ability to control the infringer’s conduct.  See Shapiro, infra notes 106-15 and 
accompanying text. 
65 Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (D.C.N.Y. 1966). 
66 Id.  The phonograph record was the primary medium for recorded music and other audio prior to 
the popularization of magnetic tape recording and, later, the compact disc.  See Steven Schoenherr, 
Recording Technology History, http://history.sandiego.edu/GEN/recording/notes.html. 
67 Screen Gems, 256 F. Supp. at 401. 
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promotion.68  On motion for summary judgment by the defendants, the court held 
that the radio station that broadcast the advertisements for the album and the 
company that packaged and shipped the album could both be found liable for 
contributory infringement.69  The court also held that the defendant advertising 
agency, which created the ads, could also be found liable.70  For these three 
defendants, the court reasoned that a factual evaluation was needed to determine 
whether they knew or reasonably should have known about the infringement—if 
they continued acting in spite of such knowledge, the elements for contributory 
infringement would be satisfied.71  This result was echoed in Gershwin, which held 
that a concert-promotion association “‘caused . . . copyright infringement’”72 by 
creating an audience for artists whom the association knew were performing 
unlicensed copyrighted works.73 
Likewise, operating a forum for the sale of infringing material can give rise 
to liability.74  In Fonovisa, vendors rented a booth from defendant swap meet in 
order to sell pirated75 recordings.76  The swap meet’s operators had actual 
knowledge of the activity, through third party notice and their own investigation, 
though they participated no further than allowing the infringers to operate as part 
of the swap meet.77  Nevertheless, copyright holders filed suit against the swap 
meet and successfully established contributory infringement.78  Here, the Ninth 
Circuit had “little difficulty in holding . . . material contribution”79  because the 
swap meet was the knowing source of the “environment and the market for 
counterfeit recording sales to thrive.”80 
                                                          
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 405. 
70 Id. at 404.  An officer and stockholder of the advertising agency, also named as a defendant 
despite being on a “leave of absence from corporate affairs” at the time, was held not liable as a matter 
of law.  Id. at 404-05. 
71 Id. 
72 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 312 
F.Supp. 581, 583 (D.C.N.Y. 1970)). 
73 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163. 
74 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
75 In the context of copyrights, “piracy” has little to do with swashbucklers, Jolly Rogers, or the 
high seas; rather, it is the term used to describe unauthorized duplication of copyrighted materials, as 
well as distribution of such duplicates.  The Software & Information Industry Association, What is 
Piracy?, http://www.siia.net/piracy/whatis.asp.  Individuals who participate in unauthorized duplication 
are known as “pirates” while the copies they make are known as “pirated” materials.  Id. 
76 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261. 
77 Id.  The swap meet operators argued that this was “passive” participation.  Id. at 264. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  The Ninth Circuit here adopted the Third Circuit’s rationale in Columbia Pictures, whereby 
providing facilities for infringement was enough to create liability.  Id.; see Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).  Specifically, the facility contributions in Fonovisa were 
“provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers.”   Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 
264.  According to the circuit court in Fonovisa, overt promotion or encouragement of infringement 
was not required.  Id.  Furthermore, it did not seem to matter to the court if the infringing materials 
could have been distributed in an alternate forum, only that “it would be difficult for the infringing 
activity to take place in the massive quantities alleged” had the swap meet denied the direct infringers.  
Id. 
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Though contributory infringement liability seems to have a long reach, it 
does not always extend to creation and sale of products that facilitate infringement.  
When the advance of consumer technology began enabling easy at-home 
duplication of copyrighted works, device manufacturers suddenly saw themselves 
under fire for contributory infringement in the landmark Supreme Court case Sony 
v. Universal.81  In Sony, copyright holders of certain television programming sued 
manufacturers of video tape recorder (“VTR”)82 devices, alleging that consumers 
were using the VTRs to infringe copyright.83  While the case is often cited for its 
lengthy discussion on fair use84 personal recording of video, the decision 
ultimately hung on a new standard:85 a product does not create secondary liability 
if it is “capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.”86  After reviewing 
the district court’s findings, the Supreme Court held that the VTRs in Sony did 
indeed have “substantial noninfringing uses” and thus, the manufacturers were not 
liable for contributory copyright infringement,87 despite the certainty that direct 
infringement was occurring using their devices. 
The Sony standard does not override the typical contributory infringement 
test in all cases, however.  In Grokster, copyright holders sued the makers of 
computer software which was used to distribute computer files on the internet.88  
There, the defendant software company argued for an application of Sony, due to 
their software’s capability for substantial noninfringing use,89 which gained them a 
victory on initial appeal.90  When Grokster reached the Supreme Court, however, 
the Court was prompted to temper its decision for clarity.91  The Court pointed out 
that, unlike the defendants in Sony,92 the defendants in Grokster intentionally 
catered to infringing users93 and induced these users to use the software to 
                                                          
81 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
82 While the subject matter of Sony specifically regarded Betamax-format “VTR”, the technology 
and usage differs little from the successive Video Home System (“VHS”) format video cassette 
recorder (“VCR”) or even digital hard-disk-based personal video recorders (“PVR”) such as TiVo.  See 
What is TiVo?, http://www.tivo.com/whatistivo/index.html. 
83 Sony, 464 U.S. at 419-20. 
84 Id. at 454 (held: use of VTRs to temporarily record inconveniently scheduled programs for 
viewing at a more convenient time, also known as “time shifting”, constituted fair use).  For an 
overview of fair use in copyright, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
85 Id. at 442.  In this case, the Court applied the staple article of commerce doctrine from patent law 
as a balancing of policy.  Id. at 441-42.  The rationale behind this application is reminiscent of fair 
use—in the end, the infringement does not materially destroy the copyright holder’s interests.  Id. 
86 Id. at 442. 
87 Id. at 435. 
88 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005).  Offensive 
to the plaintiffs here was, of course, the fact that many of the files transferred using the defendants’ 
software infringed copyright.  Id.  For a more detailed explanation of file sharing software, see A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
89 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 927. 
90 Id.  The appeals court here was affirming (albeit for separate reasons) the district court decision, 
which held against liability because it found that the defendant lacked actual knowledge of 
infringement.  Id. 
91 Id. at 934.  The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted Sony and that the intent 
was never to “displace other theories of secondarily liability.”  Id. 
92 Id. at 937. 
93 Id. at 939. 
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infringe.94  Thus, Sony is not meant to apply because Grokster already handily met 
the traditional test for contributory liability:95 it knowingly induced the infringing 
conduct of another.96 
E. Vicarious Infringement of Copyright 
Absent direct or contributory involvement with infringement, a party may 
still be liable for vicarious copyright infringement.  Again, we look to tort law for 
the roots: the principle of respondeat superior creates liability for employers on the 
acts of their employees even with no actual participation (contributory or 
otherwise) by the employer.97  For the employer, this is to be regarded as a liability 
inherent in enterprise,98 or perhaps liability stemming simply from the mere right 
of control, regardless of whether the tortuous act was actually commanded.99  
While the standard respondeat superior doctrine had already been applied to 
employees who infringed copyright while working,100 the historic decision in 
Shapiro extended the reach beyond the employer-employee relationship.101  The 
general rule for vicarious copyright infringement now is the same as it appeared in 
Shapiro: a party is liable if they had “(1) the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing conduct and (2) a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.”102 
Vicarious infringement in older common law was divided into two basic 
models of application: the “landlord-tenant” model and the “dance hall” model.103  
In the former, a landlord who leases premises to an infringing tenant is not liable 
for the tenant’s infringing conduct if the landlord is unaware of the activity, does 
not contribute to it, and receives no benefit other than the usual rent payments.104  
In the latter, one who manages a dance hall105 is liable for infringement by live 
performers, who are considered almost as employees in the respondeat superior 
                                                          
94 Id. at 937-38. 
95 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941.  More specifically, the Court described the Sony doctrine as dealing 
“with a claim of liability based solely on distributing a product with alternative lawful and unlawful 
uses, with knowledge” rather than cases where a contribution to infringement is more apparent.  Id.  at 
941 (emphasis added). 
96 Id. at 940-41. 
97 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004) (in Latin: “let the superior make answer”).  This 
doctrine also applies to agent/principal relationships.  Id. 
98 See Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1996). 
99 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262. 
100 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (C.A.N.Y. 1963) (citing, as an 
example, M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D.Tenn. 1927)). 
101 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261-62. 
102 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802 (citing Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
103 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.  The Shapiro court describes it as “two lines of precedent . . . .”  Id. 
104 Id. (citing Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938)).  Even though rent collected by 
the landlord may have indirectly come from infringement proceeds, rental payments are not sufficiently 
connected to the infringement to extend liability.  Id.  
105 The “dance hall” terminology may appear alien to younger readers, but the establishments 
referred to are synonymous with modern-day nightclubs, bars, and lounges which offer live or recorded 
music as entertainment for patrons.  Thus, if a bar hires a local band to perform and the band performs 
copyrighted songs without permission, the bar may be liable. 
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sense.  The Shapiro court undertook the task of negotiating both models with 
regards to another business arrangement in the phonograph record industry.106  In 
Shapiro, a record vendor operated as a department in defendant company’s stores 
and sold infringing records.107  The store company deducted taxes and its own 
commission from the vendor’s cash proceeds.108  The vendor’s employees were 
expected to abide by the store’s rules of conduct, though they were not actual 
employees of the store.109  Otherwise, the store company was not involved in the 
vendor’s record sales and had no knowledge of the infringing activity.110  Despite 
the lack of knowledge here, which is reminiscent of the “landlord” model, the 
Shapiro court held this situation as more analogous to the “dance hall” cases.111  
The court reasoned that the store “had a most definite financial interest in the 
success” of the vendor, because of the commission.112  Further, they “retained the 
ultimate right of supervision over the conduct of the record concession and its 
employees.”113  Thus, as far as the court was concerned, this was close enough to 
an employer-employee relationship to render respondeat-superior-like liability.114  
The court also had policy considerations behind this result, stating that such 
companies would exercise greater care in preventing infringement because of this 
decision, while being in the best position to do so anyway.115 
Vicarious copyright infringement claims often appear alongside contributory 
infringement claims, due to their similarity of application.116  And in many cases, 
the same outcome has resulted from the same facts.  In Fonovisa, the swap meet 
which hosted infringing vendors retained all the necessary power needed to police 
the infringers: not only did they create rules governing participants, but they also 
patrolled the premises and reserved the right to remove vendors from the swap 
meet.117  The defendants argued that their position more closely resembled the 
landlord model118 due to their position as a lessor to vendors.  Despite that fact, 
those other factors linked the swap meet to the conduct of the vendors and firmly 
established the element of right to control.  As for financial benefit, the court 
                                                          
106 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308. 
107 Id. at 306. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 308. 
112 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  Also, the court argued that refraining to impose liability here would create a loophole for 
stores wishing to sell infringing goods without consequence.  Id. at 309. 
116 For example, the defendants in Gershwin promoted an orchestra’s performances while knowing 
that the orchestra was infringing copyright.  Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163.  At the same time, they also 
received fees from the orchestra while providing “direction in matters such as” copyright.  Id.  Thus, 
their conduct matched both contributory infringement and vicarious infringement; and the defendants 
were simultaneously found liable for both.  Id. at 1162.  Both types of secondary infringement were 
alleged in Grokster, though the Supreme Court saw no need to evaluate vicarious infringement after 
already resolving contributory infringement there.  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 n.9. 
117 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263. 
118 See supra notes 103-05. 
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reasoned that swap meet operators saw increased income from the parking and 
admission fees of customers arriving solely to purchase the infringing materials—
more than enough to satisfy this element of the claim.119 
The Fonovisa application of vicarious infringement has applied handily to 
high-tech analogs as well.  In Napster, similar to Grokster,120 the defendant 
company was sued for creating software that allowed widespread Internet 
distribution of infringing material.121  There, infringing activities on the software 
network was likened to the swap meet in Fonovisa, since the defendant created 
incentives for more users to join and increased its own ad revenue as a result.122  
Furthermore, network operators easily had the capability to detect infringing 
activity123 and to block offending users.124  Thus, the vicarious infringement 
holding here was affirmed.125 
Not all internet services associated with infringement are at risk, however.  
In Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the ubiquitous search engine Google126 was sued 
over its image indexing service.127  This service automatically indexed publicly-
available images on the Internet and allowed users to search for particular ones.128  
Included in the index were images which infringed copyright, published by a third 
party on a separate website and made available for search by Google’s pan-Internet 
service.129  Among the various claims brought by the copyright holders was a 
claim for vicarious copyright infringement.130  While invoking Grokster131 and 
Fonovisa,132 the Ninth Circuit held it unlikely that the plaintiff could establish the 
                                                          
119 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263. 
120 See Grokster, supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.  Both cases deal with Internet file 
sharing as the means for copyright infringement. 
121 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011. 
122 Id. at 1023. 
123 Id. at 1024. 
124 Id. at 1023.  The defendants even had rules of conduct similar to Fonovisa’s swap meet, 
reserving them the right to “refuse service and terminate accounts” on the network.  Id. 
125 Id. at 1024. 
126 Due to the vast number of web sites on the Internet, the “search engine” has long been a popular 
tool for users seeking particular sites.  Curt Franklin, How Internet Search Engines Work, 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/search-engine.htm.  With a search engine, a user need only submit 
a phrase describing  their desired website and the search engine software compares the phrase against 
the engine’s large index of websites, creating a list of suggested matches for the user to visit.  Id.  At the 
time of this writing, Google has established itself as the dominant search engine through its unique 
indexing method.  Google Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/intl/en/ 
corporate/index.html.  Google has expanded its services to include online searches for digital images, 
among others.  Id.  As of this writing, all Google services online are free, with revenue generated for the 
company purely through advertising sales.  Id. 
127 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 at 711. 
128 Id. at 711.  As part of the indexing process, not only is the location of the image stored for web 
searchers, but a downsized copy of the image (called a “thumbnail” for its diminutive dimensions) is 
stored, in order to give web searchers a preview of their results without having to download all of the 
full images in their results list.  Id.; see supra note 126 for more on Google and Internet searching. 
129 Amazon, 487 F.3d at 713. 
130 Id. at 729. 
131 See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra notes 74-80, 116-19 and accompanying text. 
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requisite control element of vicarious infringement.133  According to the court, the 
plaintiff “ha[d] not shown that Google ha[d] contracts with [infringing] third-party 
websites that empower Google to stop or limit them”—as opposed to the vendors 
in Fonovisa who operated under the swap meet’s express regulations.134  
Ultimately, the infringing activity was occurring on third-party websites outside of 
Google’s control, so the court was unable to see that the control requirement was 
satisfied.135  As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that the 
plaintiffs were unlikely to prove vicarious infringement.136 
III. PERFECT 10 V. VISA: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff Perfect 10, Inc. is an adult entertainment company which 
photographs nude models and creates other media content for publication, among 
other related activities.137  Relevant to this case is Perfect 10’s website, which 
offers digital photos and other content exclusively to paying subscribers.138 
Perfect 10 claims copyright over content featured in its magazine and on its 
website.139  Perfect 10 also claims ownership and registration of the “PERFECT 
10”, “P10”, and “PERFECT10.COM” trademarks.140  Lastly, Perfect 10 claims 
“blanket publicity rights” for models they have photographed.141 
Perfect 10 alleged that several unnamed parties directly copied and altered 
materials from Perfect 10’s members-only area.142  These parties then offered the 
                                                          
133 Amazon, 487 F.3d at 730. 
134 Id.  As to the potential effect of Google’s service to “empower” infringers by pointing additional 
customers (i.e., users of the image search) towards an infringing site, the court argued that “Google 
lacks the practical ability” to selectively exclude images from their service.  Id. at 731. 
135 Id. at 730-31.  
136 Id. at 731.  With the control element failed, the court did not bother addressing the financial 
benefit element.  Amazon, 487 F.3d at 731.  However, for contributory infringement, the court held that 
Google could be held liable if knowledge of the infringement could be shown.  Id. at 729. 
137 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793;  see also Dawn Kawamoto, Porn, Google and the courts, CNET 
NEWS.COM, March 3, 2006, http://www.news.com/Porn,-Google-and-the-courts/2008-1030_3-60457 
32.html (interview of Perfect 10’s founder, including the company’s anti-cosmetic-surgery philosophy).  
The Perfect 10 magazine has ceased publication since this case was decided, though it continues selling 
back issues and subscriptions to its website.  See Perfect10.com Summer 2007, http://www.perfect 
10.com/popups/magazine.html (site may contain sexually explicit material);  see also Perfect 10 
Magazine: MagazineCity, http://www.ccgdata.com/6404-4.html (site may contain sexually explicit 
material). 
138 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793.  Subscriptions are purchased by month or blocks of months.  See 
PERFECT 10: Join Now, http://perfect10.com/join.html (site may contain sexually explicit material).  
For more information about the Internet and Internet business, see infra notes 158-59 and 
accompanying text. 
139 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793 (citing Plaintiff and Appellant Perfect 10, Inc.'s Reply Brief, Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170)).  Perfect 10’s 
ownership of these copyrights is not disputed in the case. 
140 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793;  see also U.S. Trademark No. 75,584,611 (filed Nov. 6, 1998); U.S. 
Trademark No. 78,481,207 (filed Sept. 9, 2004); U.S. Trademark No. 75,292,307 (filed Apr. 27, 1999) 
(registration records for three marks belonging to Perfect 10, Inc. related to their adult entertainment 
and media services). 
141 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793. 
142 Id. 
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materials on websites of their own for sale.143  For the purposes of this case, this is 
treated without dispute as direct copyright infringement by the unnamed parties 
against Perfect 10.144  Sale of the infringing materials was carried out using the 
defendants’ electronic payment processing service.145  As Perfect 10 was unable to 
stop the direct infringers through other means,146 Perfect 10 sent notices to the 
defendants about the infringing activity.147  The defendants took no action in 
response.148 
Defendant VISA, Inc. (Visa International Service Association, Inc., or 
“Visa”) describes itself as “the world’s largest retail electronic payments network” 
providing credit card and other payment platforms for their “clients”: an 
international collection of thousands of financial institutions.149  These member 
institutions issue Visa cards to their own customers for the customers’ use with 
participating merchants.150  The cards, known colloquially as “credit cards”, create 
limited loans of money from the financial institution to the customer.151  Through a 
credit card, merchants providing goods or services to the cardholder are paid 
directly by the issuing bank, at the cardholder’s election and convenience.152  
These charges are then repaid to the bank at a later time by the cardholder along 
with interest and other fees.153  Visa provides clearinghouse services to track 
transactions among participating customers, member banks, and merchants across 
the Visa computer network.154  Visa’s only direct contractual relationships are with 
                                                          
143 Id.  While Visa did not expressly concede these occurrences, the issue has gone largely 
uncontested.  See generally id.  Presumably, the infringing items (e.g., erotic pictures and videos) were 
offered at a price lower than the cost of regular membership at Perfect 10’s website. 
144 Id. at 800. 
145 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d. at 793. 
146 While no specific reasons were given as to why Perfect 10 was unable to stop the infringers, it 
was mentioned that the infringers belonged to several different foreign countries.  Id. 
147 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793.  In the notices, Perfect 10 identified the infringing websites, stated 
the nature of the infringement, and informed of the defendants’ involvement in the infringers’ business.  
Id. 
148 Id.  It is unclear whether Perfect 10 requested specific action (such as revocation of the payment 
processing service) be taken by the defendants. 
149 Visa Inc. Corporate Overview, 1, http://www.corporate.visa.com/av/pdf/Visa_Inc_ 
Overview.pdf.  Another named defendant, Humboldt Bank, is a financial institution operating as a 
member bank in the Visa network.  See Jim Bruene, Humboldt Bank Offers Secured and Unsecured 
Visa Cards, NETBANKER, June 19, 1997, http://www.netbanker.com/1997/06/humboldt_bank_offers_ 
secured_unsecured_visa.html.  The other remaining named defendants, First Data Corporation, 
Cardservice International, Inc., and Mastercard International, Inc., are credit/debit networks similar to 
Visa.  About First Data, http://www.firstdata.com/about/index.htm; Cardservice International Company 
profile, http://www.cardservice.com/company-profile.aspx; MasterCard Corporate Overview, 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/index.html.  While Cardservice International, Inc. and 
Mastercard International, Inc. appear to be involved with this case in the same capacity that Visa is, 
First Data Corporation may have been named only with regards to a separate, unrelated action by 
Perfect 10. 
150 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793;  see also Visa Inc. Corporate Overview, supra note 149 at 1.  Visa 
reports 1.4 billion issued cards and 27 million merchant outlets worldwide.  Id. 
151 HowStuffWorks How Credit Cards Work, http://money.howstuffworks.com/credit-card.htm. 
152 Id. 
153 Id.  Interest rates, fees, spending limits, and other terms of the card agreement are set by the 
issuing bank alone.  Visa Inc. Corporate Overview, supra note 149 at 1. 
154 Emery v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 95 Cal. App. 4th 952, 956 (Cal. App. 3d 2002). 
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member banks, not cardholders or merchants.155  Thus, Visa’s involvement is 
limited to regulating member bank behavior, collecting fees from member banks, 
and promoting the Visa name to the benefit of network participants.156 
Due to its instantaneous and electronic nature, credit card payments have 
become the “primary engine of electronic commerce”157 where cash and other 
payment methods are inconvenient or even impracticable.  In this case, “electronic 
commerce” refers to business conducted over the Internet.158  There, as with 
traditional commerce, merchants are able to offer goods and services through 
virtual storefronts or direct communications targeted at customers accessing the 
Internet.159  In order to make payments, online customers can provide their credit 
card number and authorize a charge, allowing the online merchant to utilize 
networks such as Visa’s in order to obtain instant payment from the customer’s 
issuing bank.160  Indeed, this payment system is so widespread that even Perfect 
10’s website is a participating merchant, accepting Visa payments for membership 
subscriptions.161 
Following the defendants’ inaction regarding Perfect 10’s notices, Perfect 10 
filed suit in federal district court, bringing actions for (1) contributory copyright 
infringement, (2) vicarious copyright infringement, (3) contributory trademark 
infringement, and (4) vicarious trademark infringement.162  Additionally, Perfect 
10 brought claims under California state law for “unfair competition and false 
advertising, violation of the statutory and common law right of publicity, libel, and 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.”163  The defendants 
                                                          
155 Id. 
156 Id.  By promoting its name, Visa encourages widespread use of its network, thus promoting 
extended compatibility for participants.  For example, cardholders benefit when more merchants accept 
Visa for payment and also when more banks are available to compete for better issuance deals. 
157 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794.  The importance of credit card processing to Internet commerce 
(and, consequently, to the legislature) has been specifically recognized by the Ninth Circuit and applied 
to its reasoning.  Id.; see infra note 180 and accompanying text.  Alternative payment methods do exist, 
however.  One popular example is PayPal (http://www.paypal.com/).  PayPal is the primary payment 
system for its current owner, online auctioneer eBay (http://www.ebay.com/) and allows a user to store 
money (received from other PayPal accounts, withdrawn from the user’s bank account, or transferred 
from the user’s credit card) for withdrawal or transfer to other PayPal accounts.  Margaret Kane, eBay 
picks up PayPal for $1.5 billion, CNET NEWS.COM, July 8, 2002, http://www.news.com/2100-1017-
941964.html.  In the event that a PayPal user wishes to use add credit card funds to their PayPal 
account, normal credit card processors such as Visa must be used. 
158 The Internet is a global network linking millions of computers for the purposes of 
communication, information sharing, entertainment, and business.  Among other functions of the 
Internet, computer users can freely publish and view documents known as “web pages” to and from the 
Internet public.  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Vint Cerf, 
A Brief History of the Internet and Related Networks, http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/cerf.shtml. 
159 Marshall Brain, How E-commerce Works, http://communication.howstuffworks.com/ 
ecommerce.htm. 
160 Consolidated Answering Brief of All Defendants-Appellees at 9, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l 
Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170) (customer requests card processing, merchant 
forwards to Visa, Visa forwards to appropriate bank, bank accepts and transfers funds or denies, 
merchant relays the outcome to customer). 
161 See Secure Purchase for Perfect 10, https://wnu.com/secure/form.cgi?f83+ptf83m1c+a+pa. 
162 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793. 
163 Id.  Perfect 10 is a California corporation.  Plaintiff and Appellant Perfect 10, Inc.’s Reply Brief 
at 1, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170).  Lastly, 
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filed a 12(b)(6) motion164 which was granted by the district court.165  The libel and 
intentional interference claims were dismissed with prejudice, while leave to 
amend was granted for Perfect 10’s other claims.166  Perfect 10 amended its 
complaint with the remaining claims “essentially repeated” and the defendants 
made another 12(b)(6) motion.167  This motion was also granted by the district 
court and all claims were dismissed with prejudice.168  Perfect 10 appealed the 
district court’s dismissal,169 arguing that the contributory and vicarious copyright 
and trademark infringement claims had been properly pled.170  The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision with two judges in the 
majority and one dissenting.171  Both the majority and dissenting opinions are 
analyzed in the next section.172 
IV. THE PERFECT 10 V. VISA DECISION 
A. The Majority Opinion 
Circuit Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. begins the majority opinion with a brief 
overview of the case procedural background173 and gives the court’s majority 
disposition.174  This is followed by the recitation of facts,175 a more detailed 
procedural history,176 and a short discussion of jurisdiction.177  The standard of 
review for the district court’s dismissal is de novo for all claims.178 
Judge Smith then begins the discussion with an explanation of the choice in 
defendants179 and a nod to the legislative policy in favor of Internet commerce.180 
                                                          
there was an unrelated claim that defendant First Data Corporation improperly blacklisted Perfect 10’s 
merchant account.  See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793. 
164 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for the “failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted”). 
165 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 See Plaintiff and Appellant's Reply Brief at Perfect 10, Inc.'s Reply Brief, Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170). 
171 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 792. 
172 See Part IV, infra notes 173-271 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text. 
174 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 792-93; see supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 137-61 and accompanying text. 
176 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793. 
177 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 793-94.  Original jurisdiction over the federal claims is given to the 
district court through 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338; supplemental jurisdiction covers the state law claims 
because of § 1367.  § 1291 gives appellate jurisdiction to the Ninth Circuit, which writes this opinion. 
178 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794.  Thus, facts must be construed in favor of Perfect 10, the plaintiff 
and appealing party.  Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Panaviotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2002)).  Circuit 
Judge Kozinski contends that this standard is sorely missed by the majority.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 819 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
179 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794.  Made clear here is the decision to sue involved parties other than 
the direct infringers.  Id.  The direct infringers are apparently out of reach of judicial enforcement.  Id. 
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Next, Judge Smith evaluates Perfect 10’s claim for contributory infringement 
of copyright,181 stating that the requirements are essentially the same between the 
Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court:182 knowledge of the 
infringement and either inducement, causation, or material contribution.183  With 
regards to the doctrine’s application to the Internet, Judge Smith cites the 
contributory infringement varieties found in Napster, Grokster, and Amazon.184  
Smith also notes possible application of the noninfringing-uses doctrine of Sony.185 
Judge Smith declines to “address the Defendants’ knowledge of the 
infringing activity” because the court has decided that Perfect 10 has failed to meet 
the other prong of the contributory infringement test: material contribution or 
inducement.186  Discussion is provided for the two remaining elements of the 
                                                          
at 810 n.1 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting First Amended Complaint at 8, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa 
Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170)).  The defendants here are favored 
targets for copyright litigation where the real infringers are overseas.  Susan Crawford, Perfect10 -- 
stretching towards private police, SUSAN CRAWFORD BLOG, July 4, 2007, http://scrawford. 
blogware.com/blog/_archives/2007/7/4/3071711.html.  The court also points out that “Perfect 10’s 
complaint does not clearly specify which of Perfect 10’s rights are being infringed,” guessing that 
Perfect 10 intended reproduction, derivative works, distribution, and public display.  Perfect 10, 494 
F.3d at 794 n.1; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1). 
180 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794.  Specifically, the two congressional interests here are Internet 
development and the Internet free market, to which “credit cards serve as the primary engine” according 
to this court.  Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)).  Judge Smith mentions the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) as further affirmation of this.  Id. n.2 (citing S. Rep. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998)); 
see 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
181 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
182 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794-95. 
183 Id. at 795 (quoting Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076 (citing Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162)). 
184 Id. at 795;  see Napster, supra notes 120-25; Grokster, supra notes 88-96; Amazon, supra notes 
126-36 and accompanying text. 
185 Id. at 795 n.3;  see supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.  Judge Smith admits, however, 
that Perfect 10 is not attempting to argue along the lines of this doctrine.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 785 
n.3. 
186 Id. at 795.  Were this element discussed by the majority, it most certainly would have been met 
for the purposes of reversing the dismissal.  Since notices and identifications of infringing activity have 
been alleged by Perfect 10, the action cannot be dismissed for lack of knowledge by the defendant.  Id.; 
see Plaintiff and Appellant Perfect 10, Inc.'s Reply Brief at 13, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 
494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170).  Furthermore, the receipt of notice is not disputed by the 
defendants, pointing even more strongly towards the existence of the requisite knowledge.  Perfect 10, 
494 F.3d at 793.   
Here, Judge Smith also takes the opportunity to address arguments relating to the DMCA’s safe-
harbor provision.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795 n.4; see also supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.  
Judge Smith asserts that the defendants here do not qualify as service providers under the DMCA.  
Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795 n.4.  No analysis or citation is provided to support this conclusion that an 
online credit card processor is outside the “broad scope” of the DMCA’s service provider definition.  
See supra note 54.  Regardless, Judge Smith further argues that Perfect 10 desires an “anomalous 
result” in that the take-down provision normally applies to parties who have the power to actually 
remove or block infringing content; and this is outside of Visa’s power.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795 
n.4.  Judge Kozinski of the dissent seems to think (with an equal lack of support provided) that Visa is a 
DMCA service provider and entitled to the same protections as a typical Internet access provider.  Id. at 
824 n.25 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Judge Kozinski’s argument is indeed in line with the DMCA safe-
harbor policy and procedure of infringing third parties and their passive service providers.  See supra 
note 55.  While Judge Smith is right insofar as Visa’s inability to participate in take-down compliance, 
it’s not the case that Visa is off the hook completely.  Judge Smith seems to argue that allowing Visa 
into the DMCA would mean granting the safe-harbor protection without also creating the act-after-
notice responsibility.  Service providers are restricted by more than just the take-down obligations, 
228 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. II:1 
 
second prong, however.187 
In addressing the material contribution element, Judge Smith affirms that the 
defendants had “no direct connection to th[e] infringement.”188  He first 
characterizes the infringement as resting “on the reproduction, alteration, display 
and distribution Perfect 10’s images over the Internet.”189  He then notes that none 
of these listed infringements occur over the defendants’ systems and that the 
defendants did not aid the infringers except to allow receipt of profits.190  Judge 
Smith argues that payments are not important here, as every other infringement 
occurring in this case “can occur without payment.”191  He argues even further that 
this other infringement would occur without payment.192  As support, Judge Smith 
uses Napster, where the infringement took place without monetary transactions.193  
                                                          
however.  The DCMA also provides an injunctive relief option against service providers despite their 
immunity to monetary relief claims!  17 U.S.C. § 512(j).  The types of relief available here are much 
more fitting for defendants such as Visa.  For instance, a plaintiff could obtain “an order restraining the 
service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service provider’s 
system or network who is engaging in infringing activity . . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(ii). 
187 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795-802. 
188 Id. at 796. 
189 Id.  Oddly missing here is the sale of Perfect 10’s images, which, of course, provides the 
necessary link to the defendants of this case.  Sale of copyrighted materials is indeed an exclusive right 
for copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. §106(3) (“to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale”), thus making unauthorized sale infringement under 17 U.S.C. §501(a) 
(“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder . . . is an infringer”).  While 
it’s clear how this aids the court’s argument, Judge Smith gives no reasons why infringing sale is not an 
item on which “infringement rests on” here.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796. 
190 Id.  Here, Judge Smith draws distinction from Fonovisa, where the infringing sale and 
distribution took place directly on the defendants’ premises.  Id.; see Fonovisa, supra notes 74-80 and 
accompanying text.  According to Judge Smith, it is the locality of distribution that solely mattered 
there.  Id.; see also id. at 798 n.8 (yet another distinction, this time “between location services and 
payment services”).  Since the defendants of this case were only involved in payments rather than the 
actual transfer of infringing materials, Judge Smith reasons that they are unconnected with the 
infringement.  Id. at 796.  The reasoning in Fonovisa doesn’t indicate that the locality of distribution is 
of particular importance above others, however.  While the facts of Fonovisa left the court no choice 
but to focus on distribution locality, contributory infringement is described in much more general terms: 
“a company ‘is responsible for the torts of those it permits on its premises . . . .’”  Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 
265 (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Serv., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 
1992)).  Judge Smith also distinguishes from Amazon, Napster, and Grokster, which all involved 
services that aided in finding infringing material online.  Id.; see Amazon, supra notes 126-36; Napster, 
supra notes 120-25; Grokster, supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.  The services of the 
defendants here cannot be used to find infringing material, so Judge Smith asserts that involvement is 
not established under any of those three cases either.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796.  Judge Smith’s 
reasoning here is based on his “reproduction, alteration, display and distribution” infringement list, 
which oddly conflicts with the precedent cited just as much as it does with the pleadings of this case.  
Id.  Judge Kozinski points out that locating infringing images, like paying for them, also does not fit 
into Judge Smith’s list.  Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  This discrepancy casts more doubt on 
strict adherence to Smith’s infringement definition. 
191 Id. at 796.  In other words, it’s possible the pirates’ sites could continue operating for free, 
infringing Perfect 10’s copyright in substantially the same manner, only without the involvement of any 
payment processors. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 796-97;  see Napster, supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.  This is a rather loose 
connection, especially after Judge Smith had distinguished the current case from Napster just three 
sentences earlier.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796.  By this logic, shouldn’t the defendants in Napster have 
also been absolved of liability?  After all, their users could have gone to pirate music on some other 
file-sharing network; thus, the same infringement could have taken place without the involvement of the 
defendants in Napster (the very existence of Grokster shows that alternatives were, indeed, available).  
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He continues to reiterate that the defendants’ systems “in no way assist or enable 
Internet users to locate infringing material, and they do not distribute it.”194  In 
support, Judge Smith summarizes the Amazon holding (that having simple 
measures available to prevent infringement and failing to take them satisfied 
material contribution) and insists that this cannot be applied to payment systems as 
it had for search engines.195  While admitting that the payments do provide 
financial incentive, Judge Smith argues that this creates “an additional step in the 
causal chain.”196  In this chain, the systems affect profitability, which affects 
incentives for infringement, which affects infringement itself.197  This is contrasted 
with the system in Amazon, which affects infringement directly.198 
Aside from available alternatives for infringement, Judge Smith argues that 
“other viable funding mechanisms are available” for the distributors’ operation as 
                                                          
Judge Smith’s argument here only seems to work in conjunction with his earlier argument that the 
infringement is attached to the locality of distribution.  See supra note 190 and accompanying text.  
Though an act of infringement may look the same to the end user no matter what network it occurs on, 
if we think of infringement as tied to its locality, infringement on two different networks becomes 
entirely separate.  Under this line of thinking, we can think of the infringement in Napster as “Napster-
network infringement” which indeed cannot occur without involvement of Napster’s defendants.  Users 
can still infringe elsewhere, but then it becomes “Grokster-network infringement” and so forth.  Since 
infringement, according to Judge Smith, is not tied to payment systems, we have no “Visa-network 
infringement” which can be dissolved by removing involvement by Visa.  Again, however, this is all 
dependent on the notion that infringement does indeed attach where Judge Smith says it does.  This 
argument is revisited later by Judge Smith.  See infra note 204. 
194 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 797. 
195 Id.  It appears that Judge Smith wishes to distinguish between the recipients of infringing 
material (who also pay money, in this case) and the suppliers of infringing material (who receive the 
money here), given his rhetoric.  See also id. at 799 (“Perfect 10’s images are easy to locate because of 
the very nature of the Internet . . . Defendants play no role in any of these functions.” ).  Search engines 
principally benefit the infringing aims of to-be recipients whereas payment systems only represent a 
hoop they might have to reluctantly jump through—it might be needed in order for them to get what 
they want, but it’s not exactly a benefit to them.  The real benefit of the money here goes to the 
distributors—it’s the price they themselves have named.  But why the distinction here?  Judge Kozinski 
calls this distinction “wishful thinking” and believes both should be considered material contributions.  
Id. at 811 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Both the recipients and the distributors are direct infringers—why 
does a benefit to one count as contributory while a benefit to the other does not?  Indeed, this court held 
in Amazon that search engine Google could be a contributory infringer because “Google substantially 
assists websites to distribute their infringing copies to a worldwide market and assists a worldwide 
audience of users to access infringing materials.”  Amazon, 487 F.3d at 729 (emphasis added).  The 
court gives little reason to separate the two; Judge Kozinski describes their only support as consisting of 
“disparaging use of ‘merely,’ ‘simply’ and ‘only.’”  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 812 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting).  Or does Judge Smith intend to mean that the payment systems do not “assist” either party?  
If that were the case, then the phrase “financial assistance” must be a misnomer to Judge Smith. 
196 Id. at 797. 
197 Id. 
198 Id.  No authority is cited as to how many causal steps are sufficient to discharge a party from 
liability, nor can any clues about this issue can be found in federal copyright statutes.  In the dissenting 
opinion, Judge Kozinski dismisses the “additional step” as unnecessary.  Id. at 812 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting).  To him, “[m]ateriality turns on how significantly the activity helps infringement, not on 
whether it’s characterized as one step or two steps removed from it.”  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 812.  
Judge Kozinski appears to favor a broader application of liability, though he seems confident that it 
would not create excess undue litigation in practice.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 815 (“[C]ourts have shown 
themselves adept at dealing with it from time out of mind, in resolving such issues as proximate 
causation and reasonable suspicion”).  The majority might even have been unable to reach a different 
holding because of this fear.  See id. at 798 n.9 (“We take little comfort in . . . a large number of 
expensive and drawn-out pieces of litigation that may, or may not, ever be filed”). 
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well, meaning that not only can the infringement still occur without the 
defendants’ involvement,199 but it can be funded without the defendants’ 
involvement as well.200  In a footnote, Judge Smith also expresses concern that 
allowing liability here would create a flood of “bogus notices to a credit card 
company claiming infringement” and further discourage the business out of 
general fear of litigation.201 
                                                          
199 See supra note 193. 
200 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 797-98.  As examples of alternatives for profits, Judge Smith suggests 
advertising revenue and “other payment mechanisms that do not depend on the credit card companies.”  
Id.  Indeed, there are other ways of making payments online that do not use credit cards, with perhaps 
the most prominent example being PayPal.  See supra note 157.  However, if alternative payment online 
is “viable”, what is the meaning of the earlier recognition that “credit cards serve as the primary engine” 
for Internet commerce?  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 794;  see supra note 180 and accompanying text.  If 
they are so important for online transactions that protecting them is necessary to maintain a free market 
online, then how effective can these alternative methods be?  Judge Kozinski argues that the initial 
policy recognition is correct—that “experience tells us . . . there are no adequate substitutes for credit 
cards” or we must at least accept this fact as alleged by Perfect 10.  Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  
However, Kozinski also argues that the presence of alternatives is immaterial anyway.  Id. (“It makes 
no difference whether the primary infringers might do without it by finding a workaround”).  Even 
PayPal itself makes use of regular credit card processing.  See supra note 157.  If credit cards are just 
one of many equally effective payment methods, there should be no worry that it requires sanctuary.   
Judge Smith’s line of reasoning here is also inconsistent with Fonovisa, where swap meet 
operators were still held liable despite the fact that alternative swap meets were available for vendors to 
profit from selling pirated works.  Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.  Despite the possibility of alternatives in 
Fonovisa, the court there still held that “it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in 
the massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap meet.”  Id.  Judge 
Kozinski makes the same argument against Judge Smith with regards to Amazon.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d 
at 812-13 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  There seems to be no shortage of cases where liability has applied 
despite the presence of alternatives.  Further, Judge Kozinski argues that the fabrication of possible 
alternative methods of payment is a violation of procedure here, as it is contrary to Perfect 10’s 
allegation that the infringers depend on Visa for their sales (and all allegations must be taken as true for 
the purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion).  Id. at 812 n.7, 813 (“we must work with the facts the parties 
presented below, not invent new facts on appeal.”);  see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
201 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798 n.9.  Judge Smith’s worries here have already been at issue with the 
Internet economy (albeit in a slightly different sector of it) and already answered by Congress in the 
form of the DMCA.  17 U.S.C. § 512(g); see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.  Apparently 
recognizing the potential for the very occurrence of “bogus notices,” § 512(g) could easily be applied to 
protect companies like Visa by punishing frauds.  The nature of their services’ uses over the Internet in 
relation to the rest of the Internet should more than qualify them under the DMCA’s broad “service 
provider” umbrella.  See supra note 54.  Other online payment services have already been included.  
E.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding DMCA service provider 
status applied to middleman service which facilitated, for smaller merchants, use of major credit card 
networks); Novotny v. Chapman, No. 3:05cv370, slip op. (W.D.N.C. 2006) (online fund-transfer 
service PayPal is regarded as a DMCA service provider).  While such examples are of services that are 
wholly and exclusively online, Visa’s presence in the offline world probably would not disqualify them 
for service provider status with regards to their online involvement.  One can imagine that an Internet 
service provider wouldn’t cease to be a DMCA service provider merely by branching off into non-
Internet activities.  Instead, the problem lies in the compliance with a DMCA take-down notice.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 512(g).  As pointed out by Judge Smith earlier, credit card companies do not have the power to 
take down infringing content after receiving a notice.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 795 n.4.  And while they 
would still be open to injunctions under the DMCA, the injunction subsection provides no statutory 
equivalent “grace period” of immunity in which a credit card company can act to prevent impending 
litigation, rather than acting as a result of litigation and court order.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j).  Then 
again, service of a subsection (j) injunction action itself could be seen as a take-down notice of sorts.  If 
a copyright holder threatens to injunctively force Visa to drop a merchant, the action dissolves if Visa 
complies before any litigation begins and before any substantial legal fees accrue.  But ideally, 
congressional creation of a take-down-like procedure to precede subsection (j) action would be a 
friendlier way of achieving the same result.  Under this treatment, credit card companies need not worry 
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Judge Smith again emphasizes his distinction between the location of 
distribution and the location of payment.202  After summarizing the facts and 
holdings of Fonovisa and Napster in greater detail, Judge Smith insists that it is the 
“site and facilities” provided that created the liability; wholly different from the 
current case.203  He uses this same concept to refute Perfect 10’s argument that the 
defendants’ services “allow [infringement] to happen on a larger scale than would 
otherwise be possible.”204  While Perfect 10 clearly wants Visa’s services to be 
considered “site and facilities” in order to create the analogy to precedent, Judge 
Smith sees this as an “extremely broad conception” which “appears to include any 
tangible or intangible component related to any transaction in which infringing 
material is bought and sold.”205  In Judge Smith’s view, accepting this conception 
would improperly threaten too many “peripherally-involved third parties,” 
including even computer manufacturers and electric utilities.206 
                                                          
about litigation until after they’ve received notice—they wouldn’t even need to pre-screen potential 
merchants for infringing activity before approving them!  For copyright holders, it would be a 
standardized way to stop specific instances of infringement, which they already enjoy with regard to 
other service providers. 
202 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798-99; see supra note 190. 
203 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 798-99 (quoting Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022).  
He further attempts to distinguish from Napster by noting the lack of intent by Visa: they didn’t set out 
to create their payment system for the purposes of funding copyright infringement, unlike the 
defendants in Napster who did.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 799 n.10.  Thus, the members of the majority 
here “decline to radically expand Napster’s cursory treatment of ‘material contribution’ to cover a . . . 
system that was not so designed.”  Id.  However, the court seems to have forgotten that they had done 
that very thing, in the same year that this opinion was written, no less.  Remember that in Amazon, even 
though Google wasn’t held liable for vicarious infringement, the court did hold that Google could be 
found liable for contributory infringement if knowledge could be established.  Amazon, 487 F.3d at 729.  
In fact, in that case, Google itself tried to make the argument that Judge Smith wants to make here: that 
its system wasn’t created for use by infringers.  Id. at 727.  Furthermore, Google wanted to establish 
that their system was capable of substantial non-infringing use under Sony.  Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 
442).  The court held that this argument did not apply because Perfect 10’s claim (it was the plaintiff in 
that action as well) was based on the effects of Google’s service, not of the service’s original design.  
Amazon, 487 F.3d at 727.  Here, too, Perfect 10’s complaint is not directed at Visa’s payment system 
design, so the purpose of the design should not be a reason against material contribution here. 
204 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 799.  Judge Smith argues that making infringement profitable (as seen in 
this case) is not the same as increasing infringement (as seen in Fonovisa) or making infringement 
easier (as seen in Napster).  Id.  He also points out that the defendants here did not create a “centralized 
place” for infringement as was seen in Napster and Fonovisa.  Id.  However, Judge Smith then states 
that “[t]he provision of . . . accoutrements in Fonovisa was significant only because this was part of 
providing the environment and market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive.”  Id.  This seems to 
mean that the determination should really hinge on the ultimate effect of the actions in question to the 
infringement in question, if indeed the actions themselves only matter to the extent that they make the 
infringement prosper.  Judge Smith might merely be speaking of the “centralized place” again when 
saying “environment and market” but an environment or market need not be centralized.  For instance, 
the so-called “Black Market” is far from being a centralized place or operation; the same goes for 
what’s known as the “job market”.  The Third Circuit seems to have no such problem extending 
liability “to the person who knowingly makes available other requisites” of infringement.  Columbia 
Pictures, 800 F.2d at 62 (reasoning that since an individual is liable by renting a video for the purposes 
of unauthorized public performance, liability should also apply to those who provide other services 
necessary for the public performance to happen). 
205 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 799.  Also on this page, Judge Smith reiterates his apparent distinction 
between contribution to infringing distributors and contribution to infringing recipients.  Id;  see supra 
note 195. 
206 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 800.  The favored construal seems to be limited to where Judge Smith 
believes the heart of the infringements lay.  See supra notes 190 and 195.  This presumably stems from 
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Judge Smith admits that Visa could “undermine the commercial viability of 
infringement” by refusing service.  However, Judge Smith refuses to see Visa as a 
contributory infringer because of its lack of involvement with what he sees as the 
direct infringement: “reproduction, alteration, display and distribution”—not 
sale.207 
Having found no material contribution, Judge Smith addresses inducement 
next.208  Perfect 10 has argued that the defendants have induced their customers to 
“use their cards to purchase goods and services,” which can include infringing 
purchases.209  Thus, Perfect 10 alleged induced infringement under Grokster.210  
However, Judge Smith reads Grokster as showing a much higher standard for 
inducement, whereby a product or service is presented “with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement” and not merely promotion to use a 
product or service in general, despite how some might use it.211  This can take the 
form of active promotion of infringing capabilities of a product or service or it can 
be found if “the article is good for nothing else but infringement,” in which case 
the infringing capability may be too obvious to require promotion.212  Judge Smith 
cites to Amazon as well for this principle.213  Since Perfect 10 had not alleged any 
specific acts by the defendants or any other such “clear expression” to encourage 
customers to use the cards for infringement, Judge Smith holds that inducement 
has not been established.214  Thus, with material contribution and inducement held 
insufficiently pled,215 the dismissal of Perfect 10’s contributory infringement claim 
                                                          
the main precedent cited for this case, which does not include actual credit card processors; rather, the 
contributory infringers all seem to have something to do with distribution.  Judge Smith makes it clear 
in the text that he is very unwilling to let liability extend past what’s strictly seen in precedent.  Perfect 
10, 494 F.3d at 800. 
207 Id.  Again, we are left with no rationale for why “sale” isn’t regarded as one of the direct 
infringements of this case, despite its inclusion in statute.  17 U.S.C. § 106(3); see also supra note 189. 
208 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 800. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id.  In other words, it is like the difference between advertising a gun’s ability to carry out 
murder as opposed to merely advertising the physical features of a gun. 
212 Id. at 801.  The former was clearly seen in Grokster, where defendants “explicitly targeted then-
current users of the Napster program” to use their network for piracy instead.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 
801. (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 925-26).  In contrast, the latter route is reminiscent of Sony: had the 
VTRs been found to have no other use than piracy, the “significant noninfringing use” idea would have 
never come into play to save them.  See Sony, supra notes 81-87. 
213 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 801-02.  Amazon’s inclusion is quite passive, though it is indeed 
consistent with Grokster.  The Amazon court “did recognize that contributory liability ‘may be 
predicated on actively encouraging (or inducing) infringement through specific acts.’”  Id. at 801 
(quoting Amazon, 487 F.3d at 726). 
214 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 801-02.  This appears to be a correct reading and application of 
inducement.  Even with Visa’s knowledge of the infringement and their continued promotion of card 
use, this promotion is far too general to show that Visa wanted to encourage the infringement in 
particular.  However, Judge Smith’s affinity to the recipient-centric view of infringement remains 
apparent in this analysis.  See supra note 195.  In the inducement discussion, Judge Smith only speaks 
of how Visa treated its cardholders with regards to infringement promotion.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 
801-02.  Though the result should hardly be different from Visa’s inducement of merchants, that 
relationship is completely absent from Judge Smith’s analysis. 
215 And with causation and knowledge of infringement essentially ignored (the former presumably 
not pled; the latter unnecessary to discuss given other holdings). 
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is affirmed.216 
Judge Smith covers the vicarious infringement claim in the next section of 
the opinion.217  He briefly recites the history and then the rule: “(1) the right and 
ability to supervise the infringing conduct and (2) a direct financial interest in the 
infringing activity.”218  Judge Smith also takes note of an “alternate formulation” 
by the Supreme Court: “‘profiting from direct infringement while declining to 
exercise a right to stop or limit it.’”219 
The supervision prong is addressed first.220  Here, Judge Smith notes that 
Visa has a set of rules regulating the conduct of member banks, including a 
prohibition on “providing services to merchants engaging in certain illegal 
activities” if such is discovered through investigation.221  However, Judge Smith 
maintains that the ability to enforce these rules does not equate to the right and 
ability to control the infringers.222  He draws similarity with Amazon, where 
Google’s abilities to avoid indexing infringers and to remove infringers from the 
Google advertising system were deemed insufficient for demonstrating a right of 
control over infringement.223  Like Google, writes Judge Smith, Visa can limit 
infringement, but “the mere ability to withdraw a financial ‘carrot’ does not create 
the ‘stick’ . . . that vicarious infringement requires.”224 
Judge Smith sees the defendant’s ability to control in Napster as far more 
related to the relevant infringement than that in this case.225  Specifically, Judge 
                                                          
216 Id. at 795. 
217 Id. at 802. 
218 Id. (citing Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022). 
219 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930). 
220 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802.  In a note, Judge Smith reflects two courts’ views on “supervision” 
with regard to vicarious infringement, presumably to give foundation for his own view.  Id. n.13 (“the 
swap meet operator’s ability to control the activities of the vendors” in Fonovisa; “Napster’s ability to 
police activities of its users” in Napster). Id. 
221 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802-03. 
222 Id. at 803.  Judge Smith also concedes that the direct infringement, defendants’ knowledge of it, 
and defendants’ ability to cease processing were “adequately pled” by Perfect 10.  Id. 
223 Id. (citing Amazon, 487 F.3d at 730-32).  However this holding was particularly targeted at the 
control exercised through Google’s advertising program.  See id.  Though Google’s control over its 
index listing was not found to be sufficient either, no analysis was given by the Amazon court about 
what kind of indexing factors might qualify to establish the supervision needed (e.g., if Google’s index 
happened to be the sole means of accessing the infringing websites).  Id.. 
224 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 803.  The analogy to Amazon is very weak, though.  While Google’s 
advertising program is the sole source of income for many websites, there were no facts indicating that 
this was the case for the sites at issue in Amazon.  Visa’s network plays a far more prominent role in the 
infringing businesses here than Google’s index or ad program did in Amazon.  Judge Smith thinks that 
finding vicarious liability here “would also require a finding that Google is vicariously liable” but that’s 
not necessarily the case.  Id.  In Amazon, the other prong for vicarious liability (financial benefit) was 
not evaluated at all.  Amazon, 487 F.3d at 731 n.15.  Furthermore, the clear distinction in magnitude of 
impact should be enough to make these situations independent of the same holding. 
225 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 803.  The two are far more similar than Judge Smith describes, however.   
He repeats yet again the difference in distribution as opposed to payment, which has no bearing on a 
right to control issue.  Id. at 803-04.  He further lists Napster’s powers as the “ability to block user 
access to its program and thereby deprive particular users of access to their forum” yet does not state 
how this is different from Visa.  Id. at 804.  Visa can block merchants from its payment network and 
therefore deprive access to their forum of business.  While it is true that other credit card networks or 
payment methods might be utilized instead and also true that the infringers could continue to distribute 
the material free of charge, any blocked Napster user could have switched to a different network or 
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Smith believes that Visa’s power “does not extend to directly stopping [infringing] 
violations themselves” while Napster’s did.226  Besides this, Judge Smith also 
writes that “indirect economic pressure” is not enough to constitute the requisite 
control, at least in Visa’s case.227 
                                                          
found some other way to exchange pirated material—yet, that did not stop a finding for vicarious 
infringement by the Napster court. 
226 Id.  Judge Smith argues that Visa is limited because they can not “block access to the Internet” 
or to any particular sites or search engines.  Id.  But Napster could not block Internet access either.  See 
also id. at 813 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s claim that search engines ‘could effectively 
cause a website to disappear’ . . . is quite a stretch”).  Judge Smith says Napster was able to “block . . . 
violation of the distribution right” but that is not entirely accurate.  Id. at 804 n.14.  Rather, what they 
were really blocking was the distribution right with regards to their own service.  This amount of 
control is quite diminished from Judge Smith’s description, though it does not necessarily mean Napster 
should have escaped vicarious liability.  Even though no singular file-sharing service has the power to 
completely bar users from piracy (because users can always switch to an alternate service), the entire 
body of services, together, can.  Each service does have the power to make itself uninvolved.  And one 
which chooses to stay involved exposes itself to liability.  If each service chooses to avoid this risk, then 
there are no more services for the user to turn to.  Only in that situation of group action do we have 
anything close to blocking global distribution in the meaningful sense; but it starts at the individual 
provider level.  Like Napster, Visa’s power is indeed weak, but this should not preclude a finding of 
sufficient control because the real control only manifests in the broader picture.  See also id. at 817 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts have presumed that removing the particular means of infringement 
challenged in each case would . . . diminish the [overall] scale of infringing activity”) (emphasis added). 
Judge Smith insists that “absolute right to stop the infringement” is not an actual requirement for 
right and ability to control.  Id. at 805 n.16.   This appears to be exactly what he wants to require of 
Visa, however.  See, e.g., id. at 806 n.18 (Perfect 10 does not allege “that the websites would 
completely vanish or that infringement by these sites in all its forms would necessarily cease”).  Again, 
while its control is limited, it holds the same type of individual power seen in Napster, which blossoms 
when applied more broadly.  If we instead assume that Judge Smith does not actually intend that, then 
we must believe his alternative argument, premised on his oft-used idea that only the reproduction, 
distribution, and availability of the pirated materials count as the infringement.  Id.  Thus, Visa’s control 
over the payment aspect is not control of one of the “tools needed” for infringement as defined by Judge 
Smith.  Id. at 804 n.15.  The ability to receive payment certainly is a tool of sale, however.  Yet sale, an 
enumerated exclusive right under statute, remains neglected by Judge Smith’s analysis.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
106(3) (2002). 
227 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 805.  While refusing service would be an exercise of Visa’s contractual 
rights with its merchants, Judge Smith asserts that the reduction would come only from the economic 
threat rather than the use of the contract.  Id. at 804, 805.  However, this is not true given the procedures 
Visa has in place to combat infringers, criminals, and other unwanted parties.  See infra note 271.  
There are plenty of measures available preceding actual refusal of service which are quite similar to the 
swap meet’s regulatory measures in Fonovisa and the overall practical effect is identical.  At least one 
prior case has even treated attempts to prevent infringement as establishment of control.  Warner Bros., 
Inc. v. Lobster Pot, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 478, 483 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (“[T]he fact that the defendant told his 
manager to instruct people not to play copyrighted music is indicative of Defendant Haffey's right and 
ability to control”).  See also Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F.Supp. 1184, 1185 (D.C. Minn. 1977) 
(finding requisite control where “[t]he defendant ha[d] a choice as to whether he will have [infringing] 
live music or do without, and has chosen to profit thereby”). 
Apparently sensing further misunderstanding of his opinion, Judge Smith makes clear that 
financial pressure is not per se insufficient control.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807 n.17.  Indeed, financial 
pressure appeared to be at least one of the main factors under the vicarious infringement evaluation in 
Fonovisa.  But Judge Smith states here that Visa’s particular ability to financially pressure is not “the 
sort” that the court would extend liability to, for reasons of policy.  Id.  This policy consideration is the 
same as appears in Judge Smith’s earlier remarks: that liability should be limited here because we 
would otherwise be endangering parties even further removed from the incidents.  See supra note 201 
and accompanying text.  If that is indeed the real reason why Judge Smith doesn’t see Visa’s financial 
pressure as sufficient, then there is hardly need for this holding anymore.  Such parties are easily 
protected by clever systems of law that have already been in place for decades.  Judge Smith also argues 
that the mere ability to refuse service should not be used to implicate any of these parties.  Perfect 10, 
494 F.3d at 805 n.17.  Congress seems to think otherwise, however; as evidenced by the DMCA and its 
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At the end of the section, Judge Smith describes Visa as just one of many 
entities necessary for the acts of the direct infringers while also receiving profit.228  
He even admits that Visa possesses “literal power to ‘stop or limit’ the 
infringement,” yet this is still not sufficient because the power does not stem 
precisely from the infringing acts.229 
Given the insufficiency held for right to control, the court declined to address 
the financial interest element.230  The court held that the defendants did not have 
the right and ability to control the direct infringers; thus, the district court’s 
decision to dismiss Perfect 10’s claim for vicarious infringement of copyright was 
affirmed.231 
In the final sections of Judge Smith’s opinion, contributory and vicarious 
trademark infringement were both analyzed, as were some claims under 
Californian state law.232  The dismissals for each of these claims were also 
                                                          
safe harbor, which clearly anticipate and temper this kind of result.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
228 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 806. 
229 Id.  In other words, Visa does have influence over the infringement, but only through sales that 
are incidental to the infringing acts; the influence and control, according to Judge Smith, must come 
through the acts themselves.  Id. at 804.  But again, this only works if we defy the legislation and deny 
that unauthorized sale of copyrighted works is infringement.  If Judge Smith would remember § 106(3), 
he could see that Visa’s power does indeed arise directly from one particular, enumerated protection: 
sale.  17 U.S.C. § 106(3);  see also Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, 
we can look to the intent of respondeat superior, upon which vicarious infringement is based.  The idea 
is to reduce and/or properly compensate tortious acts; employers and principals are made liable for 
compensation simply because it is in their power to reduce the occurrence of these torts.  See Lisa M. v. 
Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995).  The manner of this power is decentral 
to the thrust of respondeat superior—all that matters is that the extension of liability encourages 
reduction of torts by those who can reduce them; and that those same parties are made available as 
defendants to better insure that tort victims are made whole.  See id.  The Grokster language is quite 
compatible with this: “One . . . infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while 
declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930.  Visa fits this handsomely: 
Judge Smith himself recognizes Visa’s ability to at least reduce these infringements; and the resulting 
profits received are undisputed by the defendants. 
230 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 806.  Defendants do not dispute this element and Visa’s system is 
described as generating profit from every transaction, with no facts or allegations to indicate that 
transactions from the infringing sites were exempt from this.  In the dissent, Judge Kozinski asserts that 
“[t]here is no doubt that defendants profit from the infringing activity” due to the nature of the payment 
system.  Id. at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing First Amended Complaint at 4 and 7, Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-15170)).  Even if the fee for Visa’s 
services is very low, it’s sufficient that money comes from customers who are purchasing infringing 
materials.  Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078-79 (clarifying that Fonovisa did not create a “requirement that the 
draw be ‘substantial’”); see, e.g., Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308 (defendant “had a most definite financial 
interest” when it received “10% or 12% of the sales price of every record sold . . . whether ‘bootleg’ or 
legitimate”); Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F.Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994) (trade 
show participants received direct financial benefit from infringing use of background music at the 
show). 
231 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802. 
232 Id. at 806-10.  As these claims are outside of the scope of this article, their analysis will only be 
reviewed briefly here.  While copyright and trademark law share a “kinship” of commonality, their 
differences are important to recognize.  Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (1984).  Trademark law protects 
registered marks of businesses from unauthorized use, confusion, or dilution by similar or identical 
marks used by other parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.  For contributory trademark infringement, 
one must show inducement to infringe trademark or knowing supply of an infringing/mislabeled 
product to a direct infringer.  Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).  According to 
Judge Smith, Perfect 10 did not plead facts for inducement or for the supply of the right type of 
instrumentality.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807.  For vicarious trademark infringement, one must show 
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affirmed.233 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski dissents from the majority “for the most 
part.”234  He begins the dissenting opinion with his own brief narrative of the facts, 
emphasizing the fact that this case is essentially the final avenue Perfect 10 may 
use to protect their copyright and other interests.235  In a note, Judge Kozinski 
makes clear that most of his dissent specifically refers to member bank defendants, 
rather than the Visa network itself, where any defendants are mentioned.236  He 
also notes at the outset that the defendants here might even qualify as direct 
infringers of copyright, though such was not actually pleaded by Perfect 10.237 
Judge Kozinski argues similarity with Amazon for contributory infringement: 
that the defendants here run a payment system rather than a search engine and all 
other facts match.238  The focus is straightforward: Judge Kozinski’s idea of 
contributory liability is based on the significance of contribution in any form.239  
Applied to Amazon and this case, “[i]f infringing images can’t be found, there can 
be no infringement; but if infringing images can’t be paid for, there can be no 
infringement either.”240  While the majority is adamant in their distinctions 
                                                          
“apparent or actual partnership . . . authority to bind one another in transactions . . . or exercise[d] joint 
ownership or control over the infringing product.”  Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150.  Judge Smith 
saw the Visa-infringer relationship as insufficiently strong enough to qualify for this claim.  Perfect 10, 
494 F.3d at 808.  Perfect 10’s basis for its California state claims for unfair competition and false 
advertising were based on unusable authority.  Id. at 809.  Its California state claim for violation to right 
of publicity also lacked authority.  Id.  Its California state claims for libel and intentional interference 
with prospective economic advantage were barred by statutes of limitation.  Id. at 810. 
233 Id.. 
234 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 810 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Specifically, Judge Kozinski disagreed 
with the majority’s opinion and decision for all claims except for the two time-barred state law claims.  
Id. n.1. 
235 Id. at 810.  This is because the direct infringers are abroad and out of reach and the defendants 
refuse to comply with Perfect 10’s requests to halt service to the direct infringers.  Id. 
236 Id. at 811 n.2.  This is probably because the member banks are the entities that interact most 
closely with the infringing merchants, though Judge Kozinski also notes that liability among individual 
defendants “is a matter to be sorted out after discovery” and not truly an issue at this point in the case.  
Id. 
237 Id. n.3.  The majority seems to find this idea shocking.  See, e.g., id. at 797 n.6 (dissent’s 
language “suggests that the dissent believes that the Defendants are directly infringing when they 
process these payments”) (emphasis in original); id. at 800 n.11 (if dissent’s argument is correct, “it is 
difficult to see why Defendants would be not be [sic] direct infringers of the distribution right”) 
(emphasis in original).  Judge Kozinski points out, however, that it is possible for one party to be 
simultaneously liable of both direct and indirect infringement.  Id. at 811 n.3 (citing Alcatel USA, In. v. 
DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
238 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 811 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  And for these purposes, Judge Kozinski 
believes that payment systems and search engines are also the same.  Id. at 811-12.  The majority 
protests this argument, insisting that a search engine’s actions are material contributions because they 
assist the recipient-user, while credit card processing does not.  Id. at 797.  Judge Kozinski calls it 
“wishful thinking” to think that only the search engine substantially assists infringement.  Id. at 811 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
239 Id. at 812 
240 Id.  Under this test, “[l]ocation services and payment services are equally central to 
infringement” with no further distinction.  Id. (emphasis added).  An inequality wouldn’t remove a 
lesser service either.  Id. n.6 (“[T]his is not a race where there can be only one winner”). 
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between types of infringement aid, Judge Kozinski points out that relevant 
authority in their favor is nonexistent.241 
As to Judge Smith’s classification of sale as non-infringement,242 Judge 
Kozinski makes two arguments.243  First, he points out that sale is indeed an 
infringement, both alleged and enumerated in statute.244  Second, he demonstrates 
that the “reproduction, alteration, display [or] distribution” definition, used by 
Judge Smith to exclude Visa in the majority opinion,245 also excludes the 
defendant in Amazon, where infringement was not dismissed.246 
Judge Kozinski also argues analogy with Fonovisa, in that the online 
marketplace maintained by Visa much resembles the swap meet environment, 
including the consequences of service denial available to both.247  He then bolsters 
his material contribution argument by drawing analogies to other crimes: 
If you lend money to a drug dealer knowing he will use it to finance a drug deal, 
you materially assist the transaction, even if you never see the drugs. . . . [I]f you 
knowingly drive a principal to the scene of the crime, you provide material 
assistance, even if nothing happens during the ride.248 
Judge Kozinski writes that the significance of contribution test automatically 
guards against litigation of excess defendants, thus eliminating a major roadblock 
between the majority and a decision in favor of Perfect 10.249  Kozinski also 
encourages use of the older landlord-tenant and dance hall models of precedent as 
standards for additional significance testing.250 
                                                          
241 Id. at 813. 
242 Or, more accurately, Judge Smith’s failure to classify sale as infringement.  See supra notes 189, 
207 and accompanying text. 
243 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
244 Id.;  see 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002). 
245 See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 796. 
246 Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).; see Amazon, supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text. 
247 Id. at 814-15.  In fact, Judge Kozinski argues that the “assistance provided here” goes even 
further than it did in Fonovisa, because Visa’s network reaches far more of the Internet than a single 
swap meet could reach in the brick-and-mortar world.  Id. at 815. 
248 Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1076-79 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
249 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 815 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Judge Kozinski explains that such a test 
fits in easily among routine evaluations by courts, which are already designed to sort through many 
defendants connected by cause-in-fact.  Id.; see supra notes 201, 206 and accompanying text. 
250 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 815-16 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Judge Smith protests the use of these 
prior lines of cases, asserting that it was “developed for a brick-and-mortar world, and . . . do not lend 
themselves well to application in an electronic commerce context.”  Id. at 798 n.9.  Smith uses Napster 
and Grokster (two Supreme Court cases which evaluated contributory infringement but did not utilize 
the landlord/dancehall precedent) as support for this proposition.  Id.; see also Napster, supra notes 
120-25; Grokster, supra note 88-96.  However, as Judge Kozinski points out, those tests were 
inapplicable to both Napster and Grokster, as their systems were created for the express purpose of 
piracy.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 816 n.10 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Since the defendants’ relationship to 
the infringement was far more obvious in those two cases, there was no gray area requiring a 
landlord/dancehall distinction.  Id.  Though new technology may tempt judges to replace old standards, 
it seems the Supreme Court has urged carefulness in displacing older law.  See Grokster, supra note 91 
(Supreme Court did not want the newer Sony standard to displace the older precedent).  Judge Kozinski 
also points to a Seventh Circuit case decided subsequent to Napster and Grokster which used the 
landlord/dancehall determination.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 816 n.10 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing In 
re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
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In the next section of the dissent, Judge Kozinski addresses the vicarious 
infringement claim, using the Grokster phrasing of the rule: “profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”251  He declares 
that the profit element is already met252 and then moves on to the “stop or limit” 
requirement.253  Using Amazon, Judge Kozinski takes this as meaning both a legal 
right and a practical ability.254 
Judge Kozinski notes that Visa’s member-bank regulations describe 
procedures for responding to illegal activity such as infringement.255  Thus, the 
defendants reserve contractual power to demand cessation of infringement, with 
threat of exclusion as their ultimate means of enforcement.256  Judge Kozinski 
argues that this matches Fonovisa, where the defendants’ power and enforcement 
were identical to what was described here.257  He disputes the majority’s need for 
Visa to be able to stop infringement beyond their own networks; Judge Kozinski is 
convinced that the defendants here have the same “practical ability” to stop or limit 
infringement as seen in Fonovisa and Amazon.258  Again, Judge Kozinski stresses 
that the availability of alternatives is immaterial to this issue, as alternatives were 
also available in every other case where vicarious infringement was found.259  
Judge Kozinski does not see credit card processing as being merely a small part of 
                                                          
251 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  This is the same as the “alternate formulation” rule quoted by the 
majority.  Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 802. 
252 Judge Smith did not address this element.  See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
253 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 816 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
254 Id. n.11. 
255 Id. at 816. 
256 Id. at 817.  Two notes by Judge Kozinski examine credit card internal rules in more detail.  See 
id. at 816 n.12; id. at 817 n.13.  The majority also argues that the defendants here need to “supervise 
and control” (the dissent’s statement of the rule does not phrase it that way), but even that requirement 
seems met by the imposition and enforcement of rules—in the end, they are as good as any other 
contractual provision.  Id. at 805. 
257 Id. at 817 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Recall that in Fonovisa, the swap meet had rules for 
vendors and contractual provisions allowing them to make demands of vendors, with threat of removal 
as their power of enforcement.  Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263. 
258 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 817-18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  Though Judge Smith expressly denies 
using the higher standard, Judge Kozinski insists that the majority is exaggerating the requirements set 
in precedent.  Id. at 818 n.15.  He points out that the majority expressly rejected “practical ability” 
despite Amazon.  Id. at 817 n.16; see also id. at 805 n.17.  And, going by the majority’s contention that 
the absence of an absolute right is evidence against vicarious infringement, Judge Kozinski argues that 
the issue should thus be developed in discovery and later stages of litigation.  Id. at 818 n.15 (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting). 
Though the majority harps on the fact that Amazon held against vicarious infringement for 
Google, Judge Kozinski distinguishes that evaluation because it was presented on a preliminary 
injunction with stricter standards against plaintiffs than the motion to dismiss here.  Id. at 821.  
Furthermore, Judge Kozinski reminds us that Google lacked any contractual agreement with sites 
indexed on its image-search service (contracts were involved in their advertising program, but 
constituted a separate, peripheral enterprise).  Id. at 820.  Thus, Google had hardly any of the leverage 
against infringers we see here.  Id. 
259 Id.  The power here lies in the power of refusal to do business, an ability which Judge Smith 
deemed insufficient.  Id. at 805.  Judge Kozinski interprets the precedent as indicating that the refusal of 
service need only disinvolve the direct infringer from the defendant’s particular sphere of control, 
thereby reducing infringement in the aggregate.  Id. at 817 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
2008 CREDIT CARD SECONDARY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY 239 
 
this infringement business, either.260  Rather, he argues that credit cards were 
originally chosen as the infringers’ “preferred means of doing business”—thus, 
forcing infringers to use an alternative results in discouragement of infringement 
because it forces them to infringe in a less-preferred manner.261 
Judge Kozinski notes many ways that refusal of service could “stop or limit” 
infringement, including bankruptcy and the loss of customers who are unwilling to 
use an alternative system.262  He argues that even the majority’s description of the 
defendants’ potential influence meets the “stop or limit” requirement:263 “fear of 
losing access to credit card payment processing services would be a sufficient 
incentive for at least some website operators to comply with . . . Defendants.”264 
Finally, Judge Kozinski attacks the majority for distinguishing Napster and 
Grokster.265  While Judge Smith wrote that Visa isn’t as “directly intertwined” 
with infringement as the defendants in Napster, Judge Kozinski is adamant that it 
is.266  He argues that payment processing is easily a major element in any other 
crime267 and also an effective means of stopping infringement.268  Judge Kozinski 
suggests that the majority didn’t adopt Grokster only because they feared that too 
many parties would be swept into vicarious infringement actions.269 
                                                          
260 Id. at 817-18. 
261 Id.  There are no indications of what the pirates’ actual decision-making process was, however, 
nor of what their next highest preference was.  Judge Kozinski seems to infer that credit cards were the 
top choice simply because it’s what the pirates ultimately chose.  Id.  Judge Kozinski also remarks that 
credit card features such as dispute resolution support and processing speed also directly benefit 
purchasers of infringing material.  Id. at 817; see also id. at 818 (“[H]ow many consumers would be 
willing to send a check or money order to a far-off jurisdiction in the hope that days or weeks later they 
will be allowed to download some saucy pictures?”).  Thus, the recipients have particular interest in 
keeping the services of the defendants. 
262 Id. at 818-19.  Kozinski states that the customers might even be compelled to purchase 
membership from Perfect 10’s site, whose support from Visa would not be barred by infringing 
activities.  Id. at 819 n.17. 
263 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 819. 
264 Id. at 804. 
265 Id. at 821 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
266 Id. 
267 Id.  Again, Judge Kozinski draws analogy to a drug deal here, where “we would never say that 
the guy entrusted with delivery of the purchase money is less involved in the transaction than the guy 
who helps find the seller.”  Id.  Judge Smith would argue that the money courier is less involved than 
someone who is both a money and drug courier (the latter possesses the distribution role which the 
majority argues is required by precedent), once again making the distribution/sale distinction.  See 
supra notes 190, 195 and accompanying text.  One blogger notes that the reason credit card companies 
seem to rarely be involved in other illegal activities is because of the paper trail created.  Susan Scafidi, 
Of Credit Cards and Counterfeits, COUNTERFEIT CHIC, July 9, 2007, http://www.counterfeitchic.com/ 
2007/07/of_credit_cards_and_counterfeits.php (commenting on the Perfect 10 decision in general).  
However, Judge Kozinski seems to be arguing that the money-handling alone is more than enough and 
that we’re trying to determine whether things pass a threshold, not which of two things is more. 
268 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 821.  He even remarks that financial pressure is even “sometimes more 
effective, than technical measures that can often be circumvented.”  Id.  Judge Kozinski also claims that 
“financial support has long been held to be a basis for vicarious infringement,” though he only cites to 
one example outside of this jurisdiction.  Id. n.21 (citing Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240 
F.Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)). 
269 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 821-22.  Here, Judge Kozinski argues that the contractual right is what 
sets Visa apart from other possible defendants such as computer manufacturers, whose contracts grant 
virtually no leverage against a criminal after the criminal has purchased a computer.  Id.  Thus, there 
should be no worry of excess litigation and Grokster is otherwise quite applicable. 
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In the final sections of his dissent, Judge Kozinski argues that the trademark 
claims and state law claims were also properly pleaded, using much the same 
reasoning as he did for the copyright claims.270  He concludes that credit card 
companies simply need to be held responsible while knowingly aiding and 
profiting from infringement; that they’ve already taken measures against other 
crimes and could easily do the same to help protect copyright.271 
V. IMPACT OF PERFECT 10 V. VISA 
A. Generally 
Perfect 10 draws a bold line which secondary copyright liability cannot cross 
in the Ninth Circuit, perhaps in disagreement with what the Ninth Circuit has said 
before.272  Amid the vast, growing landscape of Internet piracy and flying 
speculations on who will next be bitten by an RIAA lawsuit, Perfect 10 blocks 
liability for an entire class of defendants.  Credit card companies are now able to 
operate with fewer worries and fewer obligations with regard to controlling the 
conduct of merchants they deal with. 
There could be general advantages as a result of this decision.  If the 
majority is to be believed, this affirmation of freedom for credit card companies 
will foster rigorous growth and development of the Internet economy and the 
Internet itself.273  Furthermore, the majority believes that this limitation on liability 
will allow many entities peripherally involved in copyright infringement to breathe 
easier and continue business without fear of litigation.274  Less litigation of this 
sort will be seen in the Ninth Circuit because of the newfound protection for this 
type of defendant.  If the dissent is to be believed, the court has just allowed a 
significant partner in copyright infringement to escape responsibility,275 while 
copyright holders are unjustly limited from protecting their assets.276 
                                                          
270 Id. at 822-23.  These claims are outside the scope of this article. 
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276 Perfect 10, 494 F.3d. at 810. 
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B. Impact on Ninth Circuit Law 
As discussed in the analysis of the majority’s opinion, Perfect 10 has 
committed grave errors in failing to recognize “sale” as a means of 
infringement,277 not to mention its overstated fears of excessive future litigation278 
and unpersuasive attempts to distinguish Visa from past defendants.279  The dissent 
also argues that this decision represents a massive departure from prior, even 
recent, precedent.280  The sentiment is echoed throughout the intellectual property 
blogosphere, which seems to point at all three Perfect 10 cases of 2007 as being 
problematic for this area of law.281  This could be the cause for confusion in future 
cases, which must reconcile this new line that the majority has drawn between 
distribution and payment;282 a line which the dissent finds arbitrary and 
unsupported.283  Other circuits may side with the dissent here and forge their own 
standards in conflict with the Ninth Circuit majority, though they will undoubtedly 
see fewer cases of this sort in their jurisdictions.  Even the Ninth Circuit, which is 
now technically bound by this decision, may find reason to abandon the Perfect 10 
reasoning after all, or find reason to forever distinguish it.  A significant majority 
of legal commentators have come out in support of Judge Kozinski’s dissent over 
the majority’s shaky argumentation,284 with one blog even giving the dissent a 
“runner-up” prize for the “Best Legal Decision” of 2007.285  Another openly calls 
for the Ninth Circuit to re-evaluate their entire line of precedent; to “bite the bullet 
and wipe those cases (and their progeny) off the books.  Otherwise, the Ninth 
Circuit will torture itself each time it tries to reconcile new opinions with those 
erroneous opinions.”286  Perhaps more practical advice for intellectual property 
lawyers is to be quite aware of the strong arguments made in Kozinski’s dissent—
                                                          
277 See supra notes 189, 207 and accompanying text. 
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though dicta, it certainly holds persuasive weight.287  The Californian courts may 
have already been acting in line with Kozinski, at least with regard to the state law 
claims that later appeared in Perfect 10.288  Time will tell whether the majority 
opinion actually holds weight in federal practice. 
It is also possible that Congress will amend the DMCA to specifically 
include online credit card processors as service providers,289 thereby affording the 
processors a protective procedure and a clearer delineation of liability.290  Clarity 
in this area of the law is very much needed from Congress, if the courts are unable 
to agree. 
C. Online Payment Processors 
Credit card companies like Visa and other online payment services operating 
in the Ninth Circuit can rejoice.  For now.  Though the Ninth Circuit has 
essentially given carte blanche to payment processors with regards to merchants 
who infringe copyright, a district court may not take Perfect 10 so seriously.  Or it 
may construe the majority’s confusing reasoning in Perfect 10 in an unpredictable 
manner, finding that the particular circumstances perhaps warrant liability for a 
payment processor that differs from Visa in minute ways.  Lastly, a district court 
may simply like Kozinski’s dissent better, as many readers have, and swiftly 
impose liability on a defendant who didn’t see it coming.  The best advice for 
payment processors is to realize that they may not be out of the woods just yet.  Be 
well-versed with Judge Kozinski’s arguments if you’re served with process for 
secondary copyright liability.291  Safer still, listen to legitimate complaints about 
infringing conduct by your member merchants—if anything, it is a good public-
relations move to deny support for those who profit from illegal activity.292  After 
all, as seen in Perfect 10, the complainant at your door might even be another 
member merchant of yours293 who needs your help. 
D. Copyright Holders 
If your income derives substantially from exclusive control over your 
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copyrighted works, this decision hurts for you.  Under the Perfect 10 holding, 
offshore pirates of content are free to profit from the unauthorized online 
distribution of your works.  Due to jurisdictional problems, you can’t sue them 
directly.  Due to Perfect 10, you can’t go after their payment systems in order to 
stop their flow of money.  However, you do have supporters on your side, 
including at least one adamant Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge.  They may 
very well change the landscape of the Ninth Circuit’s treatment and make it viable 
again to sue credit card companies as secondary infringers.  But for now, it may 
prove more successful to litigate in another venue where the Perfect 10 majority 
isn’t binding and where the Perfect 10 dissent may find open ears.  Try litigating 
from a standpoint of the DMCA’s injunction provisions,294 where you need only 
show that the defendant is a qualified service provider and can limit the 
infringement by banning a particular member of their service.295 
Concerned parties and their respective interest groups may also want to 
lobby Congress for an extension of the DMCA.  If Congress were to include a 
specific take-down procedure for entities such as payment processors, protection of 
one’s copyright interests against these offshore pirates can be achieved in a simple, 
standardized process.  Copyright holders may already be used to exercising this 
type of procedure when their work appears unauthorized on a user-submission site 
like YouTube.296 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Perfect 10 v. Visa, the court upheld secondary liability for distribution 
services that aided copyright infringement but refused to allow this liability to 
extend to payment processing services used by infringers.  While the majority 
rightly charged itself with the duty to define limits for secondary liability, it may 
have drawn this line too short of where it should be.  The key distinctions made 
appear to be based in naïveté, speculation, and selective ignorance.  And though 
legitimate concerns also formed this decision, the majority seems to analyze 
precedent in a peculiar, self-affirming manner.  The dissent would say the court is 
simply reading it wrong. 
The great divide created here, right or wrong, has a powerful impact both on 
online sales and on copyright enforcement.  Given that his means of distribution 
are overseas or otherwise judgment-proof, the pirate’s ability to profit in the Ninth 
Circuit is, for now, untouchable. 
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